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Radicalization to violence is a persistent and evolving challenge. The scholarship on the 
subject, however, often treats born Muslims and converts interchangeably. Although Salafi-
jihadist inspired radicalization has received substantial attention, scholars rarely focus their 
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Abstract 
The scholarship on radicalization to violence often treats born Muslims and 
converts interchangeably; far too little research is focused on understanding the 
factors and processes driving converts in particular. This is a problem given that 
there is overwhelming evidence demonstrating that Muslim converts are 
overrepresented among Western foreign fighters. Data from Canada corroborates 
this larger point: converts are highly representative in attempted and successful 
domestic terrorist attacks. Our article explores conversion to Islam and political 
violence as it relates to recent trends in Canadian Jihadist militancy. We distill the 
theoretical literature on conversion and radicalization to seven explanatory factors, 
including ideology; social networks; charismatic authority; political grievances; 
psychology; socio-economic and criminal circumstance; and enabling 
environments. We then build original empirical case studies – based on expert 
interviews and open-sourced documents – of three Canadian converts who 
engaged in terrorism, including John Maguire, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, and 
Damian Clairmont. Using these case studies, we contextualize, analyze, and 
expand our collective understanding of conversion to violence, providing lessons 
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efforts on understanding the factors driving converts in particular.2 This is a problem given 
that there is overwhelming evidence demonstrating that Muslim converts are overrepresented 
among Western foreign fighters.3 Data from Canada corroborates this point: converts are 
highly representative in attempted and successful domestic terrorist attacks.4 The Canadian 
Networks for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society’s Canadian Incident Database list 
1,800 incidents of violent extremism in Canada between 1960 and 2014.5 The only two deaths 
attributed to ISIS-inspired violence since 2014 were conducted by Canadian converts: Martin 
Couture-Rouleau conducted a vehicular attack against members of the Canadian Forces, 
killing Warrant officer Patrice Vincent; Michael Zehaf-Bibeau (Z-B) fatally shot Corporal 
Nathan Cirilo – a Canadian soldier on ceremonial sentry duty at the Canadian National War 
Memorial in Ottawa – and subsequently stormed Parliament Hill. Canadian converts have 
likewise played a prominent role as foreign fighters: Damian Clairmont, a convert from 
Calgary, joined Syria’s Jabhat Al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, in 2012, and was killed 
fighting in 2014; John Maguire joined ISIS in 2012 and was featured prominently in ISIS 
propaganda, threatening “indiscriminate” attacks against Canadians.  
Several research questions arise. What factors help explain why converts to Islam are 
susceptible to the lure of violent extremism? What are the causal pathways leading from 
conversion to extremism and violence? And from the Canadian context, do existing theories 
of Jihadist radicalization accurately explain the observed variation among Canadian converts 
and Canadian-born Muslims; what antecedent conditions account for the radicalization of 
 
2 Salafi-Jihadism focuses on the religious basis of jihadism. According to Maher, Salafi jihadism is based on five 
doctrines of faith: jihad in the sense of holy war, tawhid, (the oneness of God), hakimiyya (meaning true Islamic 
government), al-wala wal-bara (loyalty to divine truth and rejection of untruth and polytheism), and takfir (the 
naming of disbelievers). Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (Oxford, 2016).  
3 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2015):81; B. Van Ginkel,  
and E. Entenmann (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats & 
Policies,” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7: 2 (2016); Angel Rabasa and Cheryl 
Benard, Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015): 6; Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State (New York: 
Oxford, 2017): 20. 
4 Alex Wilner and Irfan Yar, “Canadian Terrorists by the Numbers: An Assessment of Canadians Joining and 
Supporting Terrorist Groups,” Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2019: 22. 
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Canadian converts, and do these factors transcend beyond religious and political context?
 This article explores conversion to Islam and political violence as it relates to recent 
trends in Canadian Jihadist militancy. Our argument unfolds in three sections. Section one 
distills the theoretical literature on conversion and radicalization in an attempt to identify the 
core factors that help explain the phenomenon. It does so by providing a concise literature 
review of the emerging subfield disaggregated into seven core explanatory factors that are 
generally accepted by the wider scholarship as the most important elements linking 
conversion to violent radicalization. These factors include: ideology, social networks, 
charismatic authority, political grievances, psychology, socio-economic and criminal 
circumstance, and enabling environments. Section two of the article provides original 
empirical case studies – based on expert interviews and open-sourced documents – of three 
Canadian converts who engaged in terrorism, including the aforementioned Maguire, Zehaf-
Bibeau, and Clairmont. These three individuals share important characteristics: each was 
single during the radicalization process; none had previously travelled abroad before 
conversion or had known contacts with foreign extremists; each appears to have been 
affiliated with ISIS and were eventually killed while participating in terrorism; and each 
expressed abhorrence of Canadian (and Western) foreign policies. The case studies 
themselves are informed by original interview data collected with individuals closely and 
personally related to Maguire, Zehaf-Bibeau, and Clairmont, including Ms. Christianne 
Boudreau, Clairmont’s mother, Imams Navaid Aziz and Zijad Delić, both involved in 
deradicalization initiatives across Canada, and Adam Hirwa and Anonymous, friends of 
Maguire and Z-B, respectively.6 Finally, section three of the article, functioning as our 
conclusion, analyzes the case studies against the factors identified in the literature, providing 
lessons for theory and methodology therein, and guidelines for further research. 
 
 
6 Ethics approval to conduct the interviews was granted by Carleton University’s Office of Research Ethics. 
Interviews took place in 2019. They were held in person in Vancouver, Calgary, and Ottawa, Canada. All 
interviews were semi-structured in nature and most lasted one hour; none were recorded. All content within the 
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Conversion to Extremism: Seven Explanatory Mechanisms 
 
Relative to the number of foreign fighters who were born Muslim, several recent studies 
demonstrate an overrepresentation of converts fighting for jihadist factions in Syria and Iraq.7 
Muslim converts are often described as having a particular “zeal” upon embracing their new 
faith – an idea often linked to perceived higher levels of activism (and radicalization) – as 
opposed to Muslims who were born into the religion. Ari Fodeman and colleagues, for 
instance, argue that because of their innate desire to find and dedicate themselves to a source 
of “congruent meaning,” converts are more likely to defend their newly found ingroup and 
“source of meaning” from opposing – and at times, even existential – sociopolitical threats.8 It 
follows, then, that converts, as opposed to non-converts, can show a higher level of activism – 
which according to the authors “fully mediated the relationship between conversion and 
radicalization” –  and could be more likely to engage in extremist and violent behavior as a 
result.9 Sam Mullins, in his extensive study of American and British converts and 
radicalization to violence, points to a slightly different explanation: He finds that converts are 
often socially and economically marginalized in comparison to non-converts, and show 
greater rates of unemployment and criminality.10 Interestingly, Mullins further argues that 
American converts are much less likely to have gained training overseas or to have engaged in 
fighting abroad, and are more likely to act alone within domestic plots. Their socio-economic 
marginalization and an inability to achieve the American dream, Mullins argues, may drive 
some converts to find “belonging and acceptance” in violent jihad that may also provide 
“opportunities for excitement and fame” and a “chance to strike back against those who 
 
7 Stern and Berger, ISIS, 81; Rabasa and Benard, Eurojihad, 6; Amarnath, Amarasingam, and Lorne L. Dawson, 
““I left to be Closer to Allah”: Learning about Foreign Fighters from Family and Friends,” ISD, 2018; Bart 
Schuurman, P. Grol & S. Flower, “Converts and Islamist terrorism: An introduction,” ICCT Policy Brief, 7(3): 
2016.  
8 Ari Fodeman, Daniel Snook, and John Horgan. “Picking Up and Defending the Faith: Activism and Radicalism 
Among Muslim Converts in the United States,” Political Psychology 41:4 (2020): 681. 
9 Ibid., 694. 
10 Sam Mullins. “Re-examining the involvement of converts in Islamist terrorism: A comparison of the US and 
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rejected them.”11 In another – uniquely diverse and in-depth – exploration of fifteen cases, 
Eitan Azani and Liramn Koblentz-Stenzler find a connection between the Da’wah system12 
and the radicalization of converts.13 The propagation of radical Islamic ideologies through 
Da’wah aims to “create an infrastructure of activists who are devoted to the Islamic message, 
the idea of renewing the Caliphate, and promoting the vision of an Islamic Nation.”14 The 
authors find that the central difference between converts and non-converts is the relatively 
short period in which a convert radicalizes and becomes connected to jihadist groups, a 
process that occurs as a result of their social exclusion, desire to prove themselves, and 
adoption of radical ideas.15 Azani and Koblentz-Stenzler’s study highlights several other 
components potentially informing this process: family or economic problems and personal 
trauma; particular personality traits, including violent tendencies and emotional responses; 
and a history of criminal activity.16 Concerning the last point, prisons and their effect on 
radicalization processes have been of particular interest to scholars; some have dubbed the 
“new type of jihadist” as “part terrorist, part gangster,” making use of “skills honed in 
lawbreaking” for engagement in violence.17 What follows is an assessment and evaluation of 
these and other findings stemming from the larger literature on the subject, distilled into the 
seven factors most often linking conversion and radicalization. These factors later animate the 
subsequent empirical exploration of our three Canadian case studies.  
 
Ideology  
While there may not be a standard relationship between conversion to Islam and the 
subsequent embrace of the Salafi-Wahhabi sect, some scholars argue that this strictly 
 
11 Ibid., 77.  
12 Da'wah (Arabic:  دعوة, [ˈdæʕwæh] “invitation”, also spelt daawa, dawah, daawah or dakwah;) is the act of 
inviting or calling people to embrace Islam. 
13 Eitan Azani and Liram Koblentz-Stenzler, “Muslim Converts Who Turn to Global Jihad: Radicalization 
Characteristics and Countermeasures,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2019): 4. 
14 Ibid., 4. 
15 Ibid., 6-7. 
16 Ibid., 8. 
17 Simon Cottee. “Reborn into Terrorism: Why are so many ISIS recruits ex-cons and converts?” The Atlantic, 
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conservative theological orientation is the default position among jihadists and foreign 
fighters the world over. Indeed, there is no shortage of literature depicting ideology as being 
responsible for the radicalization of converts.18 Other experts point to a causal relationship 
between increases in religious practice and violent extremism.19 Though Lorne Dawson 
subscribes to this view, the author elsewhere concedes that converts generally have scarcer 
and weaker ideological underpinnings and are, after conversion, “structurally available” and 
more likely to fall prey to jihadist narratives.20 On the other end of the spectrum, Olivier Roy 
entirely disputes the putative relationship between fundamentalist ideologies and 
radicalization, asserting that “terrorism does not arise from the radicalization of Islam, but 
from Islamization of radicalism.”21 In brief, there is an ongoing academic debate on the 
importance of ideology in the radicalization process of converts. 
 
Social Networks  
 For converts, social networks and friendships with other Muslims are often the central 
sources of knowledge they need to practice the new faith. Forming networks with religious 
community members is generally a positive development, but some friendships can create 
associations that compel converts to entertain and accept potentially violent interpretations of 
their new faith. Emmanuel Karagiannis suggests loneliness and isolation make converts 
dependent on group interrelationships and, in some cases, progression to radicalization.22 
Branching off from this discussion, Bruce Hoffman in his analysis of the radicalization of 
 
18 Maha Azzam, “The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and Global Dimensions,” The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 13:2 (2007): 131-132; Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher, “Examining the 
Role of Religion in Radicalization to Violent Islamist Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35:12 
(2012): 859; Scott Matthew Kleinmann, “Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants in the United States: 
Comparing Converts and Non-Converts,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35:4 (2012): 284; Scott Flower, 
“Muslim Converts and Terrorism,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 5:11 (2013): 9. 
19 Amarasingam and Dawson. “I left,”; Clara Egger and Raùl Magni-Berton, “The Role of Islamist Ideology in 
Shaping Muslims Believers’ Attitudes toward Terrorism: Evidence from Europe,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism (2019): 1-24. 
20 Lorne Dawson, “The Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists: 
Opening a Dialogue,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22:1 (2009): 6. 
21 Roy, Jihad and Death, 8. 
22 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization,” Politics, Religion & 
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diaspora communities finds that group involvement leads individual converts to become 
increasingly tied to multinational terror networks.23 Rabasa and Benard corroborate this 
argument by referring to converts from Spain.24 Since converts lack the cultural context to 
weed out extremist rhetoric, they may come to rely heavily on people they meet in person or 
online.25 Conversely, in their analysis of radicalized Danish converts, Manni Crone and 
Martin Harrow find that radical converts conduct terrorist operations with a degree of 
autonomy from external networks, and without links to organizations operated by radicals 
abroad, suggesting that radicalization does not solely occur directly through an interpersonal 
relationship with global jihadists networks.26 Arguably, a subject of debate in this context is 
not whether social networks play a role in convert radicalization but whether radicalization of 




Radicalization scholars are largely in a consensus that charismatic leaders often play a 
crucial role in radicalizing converts by contextualizing and utilizing political or societal 
grievances.27 Indeed, the idea of charismatic mentorship extends beyond jihadist movements 
and includes many examples of non-Muslim mentors, such as Vellupillai Prabhakaran of the 
LTTE, Abdullah Öcalan of the PKK, Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Shoko 
Asahara of Aum Shinrikyo, among others. The most popular and recent examples of 
charismatic jihadist mentors are Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Osama Bin Laden, and Anwar-al-
Awlaki. The accessibility of radical lectures online, and the challenge of locating extreme 
 
23 Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, Andrew J. Curiel, and Doron Zimmermann. The Radicalization of 
Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, 
2007: 39. 
24 Rabasa and Benard, Eurojihad, 90-97. 
25 Ibid., 91. 
26 Manni Crone and Martin Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
23:4 (2011): 534. 
27 Kleinmann, “Radicalization,” 285; Karagiannis, “European Converts,” 109-110. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Inside 
Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2009): 220; David  
Hoffman and Lorne Dawson. “The Neglected Role of Charismatic Authority in the Study of Terrorist Groups 
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mentors on the ground, is an evolving counterterrorism challenge. Charismatic leaders are 
also involved in the formation and strategic operation of militant groups.28 Converts can meet 
such mentors in various environments and become part of their wider network.  In short, 
terrorism experts argue that charismatic leaders are often involved in a variety of different 
activities, including the recruitment of would-be jihadists by channeling political grievances 
towards what Roy calls “fragile individuals” or what Amarnath Amarasingam and Dawson 
refer to as “seekers.” 
 
Political Grievances 
 Several authorities argue that Western foreign policy plays a role in the radicalization 
of converts, shaping political grievances against which political Islam appears to have the 
ideological foundation to challenge Western imperialism.29 For instance, Clark McCauley and 
Sophia Moskalenko suggest that individuals are sometimes driven to radical action and 
violent extremism “in response to political trends or events.”30 The authors refer to several 
examples to make the argument including the case of John Allen Muhammad – a convert – 
and his protégé Lee Boyd Malvo, who killed ten people in the Washington, DC, area in 
2002.31 Similarly, Alison Pargeter suggests that jihadist groups have expressed opposition to 
Western policies and the Western way of life in general.32 In her view, converts have seen 
 
28Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2011): 
93; Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009): 36-37; F.M Moghaddam, “The 
staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration,” American Psychologist 60:2 (2005): 165-166; Marc 
Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004): 64, 104, 116-
7. 
29 Karagiannis, “European Converts,” 107; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political 
Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 419; Alison 
Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe (New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2008.): 172; 
Juan Jose Escobar Stemman, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities 
in Europe,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs 10:3 (2006): 10; Alex Wilner and Claire Jehanne 
Dubouloz, “Transformative Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34:5 (2011); Wilner and 
Dubouloz, “Radicalization as Transformative Learning,” in Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization, Silva 
and Deflem (eds), (Emerald: Sociology of Crime, Law, and Deviance, Vol. 25, 2020). 
30 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms,” 419. 
31 Ibid., 419. 
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Islam as a religion that can stand up to Western imperialism and capitalism.33  Building on 
this, Karagiannis similarly argues that jihadist literature has often made references to conflicts 
in places such as Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir, and the Balkans where Muslims have 
suffered at the hands of “infidel” aggression.34 Karagiannis points to cases such as the French 
terrorists Lionel Dumont and David Vallat who testified that footage from the Bosnian War or 
the Chechen conflicts was a trigger of their radicalization.35 In disagreement with the 
mainstream scholarship, however, Scott Matthew Kleinmann finds that political grievances as 
a mass-level mechanism do not affect the radicalization of converts specifically.36 While 
political grievances are often cited as a major source of radicalization, this paper will assess 
the degree to which they played a role in the radicalization of Canadian converts.  
 
Psychological Factors 
 In a meta-study exploring empirical evaluations of radicalization, Oluf Gøtzsche-
Astrup, notes that there is “strong evidence” that the “psychology of radicalization is 
essentially about normal mechanisms rather than abnormal or pathological processes,” but 
that core “motivational processes” nonetheless outweigh other, rational instruments of “risk 
and reward.”37 Relatedly, there are several psychological factors identified in the literature 
that may predispose and motivate an individual towards violent jihadism, including emotional 
susceptibilities, psychology, personality, and cognitive function.38 Kleinmann’s extensive 
study of 83 cases of radicalized individuals illustrates that psychological factors were present 
in 59 percent of radicalized converts but only 10 percent of born Muslims.39 His inquiry finds 
that some converts were clinically diagnosed with mental health issues involving problems of 
 
33 Ibid., 172. 
34 Karagiannis, “European Converts,” 107. 
35 Ibid.,107. 
36 Kleinmann, “Radicalization,” 289. 
37 Oluf Gøtzsche-Astrup, “The time for causal designs: Review and evaluation of empirical support for 
mechanisms of political radicalization,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 39 (2018): 96. 
38 Aly and Striegher, “Examining the Role,” 859; Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism, 220; Kleinmann, 
“Radicalization,” 290. 
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low self-esteem, attention-seeking, identity issues, and high-risk tendencies.40 He also found 
evidence of abuse and neglect. McCauley and Moskalenko corroborate this view suggesting 
that converts with a history of trauma – such as surviving auto accidents, rape, and other 
forms of violence – appear more likely to join extremist movements.41 Referring to a case 
study of a European convert, Amarasingam and Dawson list three psychological factors 
associated with radicalization, including a “desire to make a mark in the world,” anxiety about 
“moral problems and doing the right thing,” and a predilection towards “action … adventure 
and risk.”42 Surprisingly, while the literature uncovers the role that personality, anxiety, and 
trauma-related disorders may have on radicalization, very little research links radicalization of 
converts to other mental health illnesses such as substance abuse and depression.  
 
Socio-Economic and Criminal Circumstance  
Carolin Goerzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi analyze the radicalization of converts 
through the lens of social identity theory.  In their view, developing a radical identity is a 
result of public discourse that produces public polarization, forcing some new Muslims 
towards a particularly violent end state. Public anti-Islamic discourse leads converts to stand 
in radical defense of Muslims.43 Interestingly, Farhad Khosrokhavar asserts that European 
converts in comparison to “white” American Muslims, are more likely to radicalize due to 
their socio-economic class. He finds that American Muslims are generally middle class, and 
often share the American dream, whereas European Muslims mostly stem from the lower 
class, have less education, and are often economically excluded and socially marginalized. 
Khosrokhavar further highlights the role certain urban districts, like areas of Leeds, Britain, or 
the French banlieues, have in relation to radicalization.44 Likewise, Rabasa and Benard 
provide a reference to the extensive Renseignements Généraux report that analyzed 1,610 
 
40 Ibid., 286-287.  
41 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization,” 429. 
42 Amarasingam and Dawson, “I left,” 21. 
43 Carolin Goerzig and Khalid Al-Hashimi, Radicalization in Western Europe (Routledge, 2015): 158. 
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converts with a history of crime, active proselytism, or connections to jihadist networks.45 
Ninety percent of radical converts who joined extremist groups had less than a college degree, 
whereas 71 percent were either unemployed or employed in unskilled jobs.46 Socially, Scott 
Flower finds that radicalization of converts arises because they abhor globalization, 
modernity, and secular society.47 He proposes that most radical converts suffer from a degree 
of social alienation. Feelings of personal victimization in social environments have also been 
associated with jihadism. According to Karagiannis, personal victimization in the form of 
discrimination results in anger that “could be transformed into rage, hatred, and a desire to 
take revenge.”48 Conversely, Kleinmann finds that racism, discrimination, and police brutality 
do not appear to affect convert radicalization.49 Roy, going further, argues that socio-
economic factors are mostly irrelevant; there is little correlation between socioeconomic 
indicators and extremism.50 And yet, criminal history is often associated with radical converts, 
in part because many converts (who later radicalize) appear to have embraced Islam while in 
prison, or as a result of social interactions while serving a prison sentence. As Rabasa and 
Benard demonstrate in their study, “nearly 17 percent of those who convert to Islam in prison 
join radical Islamist groups or their support networks.”51 Thus, converts that embrace the faith 
in prison appear more inclined towards radicalization. In agreement, Roy and Kleinmann find 
that the history of petty crimes among converts is often linked to their later radicalization.52 In 
sum, the literature is divided concerning the role socio-economic and criminal circumstances 
have on violent radicalization.  
 
 
45 Rabasa and Benard, Eurojihad, 91. 
46 Ibid., 92. 
47 Scott, “Muslim Converts,” 8. 
48 Karagiannis, “European Converts,” 106.  
49 Kleinmann, “Radicalization,” 290. 
50 Ibid., 33. 
51 Rabasa and Benard, Eurojihad, 91-2. 
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Enabling Environments  
A number of different studies demonstrate that mosques, prisons, and the internet are 
the most common enabling environments of radicalization.53 Generally, the internet appears to 
have the most impact on contemporary recruitment. Jihadists active in Syria and Iraq, for 
instance, all made extensive use of social media platforms, including Ask.fm, Facebook, 
Instagram, WhatsApp, PalTalk, kik, viper, JustPaste.it, and Tumblr, to attract attention and 
recruits.54 Twitter has been identified as a popular communication platform for jihadists who 
use it for operational strategy.55 The use of social media to radicalize, recruit, and plan 
violence may have likewise diminished the importance of religious institutions in 
radicalization.56 Many converts will have likewise relied on the internet to learn about Islam 
before converting, and once they do, will return online to find the information useful for 
practicing their newfound faith. Online activity may influence a convert’s interpretation of 
Islam, putting them in contact with potentially radical material and individuals. Religious 
courses in private homes (rather than religious institutions), and visits of extreme recruiters, 
are also increasingly important.57 Indeed, these factors tie to the earlier discussion of radical 
mentors who are involved in the formation of extremist groups and can inspire individuals to 
participate in violence. 
 
Canadian Converts to Violence: Maguire, Zehaf-Bibeau, and Clairmont 
 
What follows next is an empirical exploration of the life histories of three Canadian extremist 
converts, built using a combination of open sources and interview data. The cases provide 
contextual information relating to the causal mechanisms linked to extremist conversion as 
identified in the literature.  
 
53 Rabasa and Benard, Eurojihad, 91-105; Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism, 211; Karagiannis, “European 
Converts,” 110. 
54 Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38:1, (2015): 1. 
55 Ibid., 1. 
56 Stemman, “Middle East,” 11. 
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John Maguire (Abu Anwar al-Canadi, a.k.a Yahya) 
John Douglas Maguire grew up in the Village of Merrickville in Eastern Ontario, 
Canada. He went to North Grenville District High School in Kemptville, Ontario, where he 
was perceived as an intelligent, outgoing, and popular person.58 He “kept to himself about a 
lot of things that were either important or … that bugged him.”59 As an excellent student who 
was elected to the student council, Maguire became a member of the “school’s most-envied 
social circles.”60 His hobbies included playing hockey, riding motocross, and playing the bass 
guitar. In 2003, when he was 12 years old, his parents’ marriage broke down.61 His mother, 
Patricia Earl, claimed that she was a victim of spousal abuse.62 In Grade 12, Maguire lived 
with his grandparents before moving to Ottawa, Canada’s Capital, to attend Hillcrest High 
School.63 His Kemptville classmates said this was unexpected and his response was strange: 
he “just got rid of everyone on Facebook and kind of disappeared.”64 Scoring highly on the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) in 2009, Maguire earned a scholarship and admission to Los 
Angeles City College’s business school in the United States.65 While studying in LA, he 
purportedly found Islam. He returned to Ottawa in September 2010 to continue his studies at 
the Telfer School of Management at the University of Ottawa (U of O) and officially 
announced his conversion to Islam on Facebook. He told his friend, Stephane Pressault, 
another convert, that he found the faith by researching eschatology (e.g. end of the world 
theology).66 Although raised in a secular family, Maguire quickly became a practicing and 
devout Muslim. 
Maguire’s progression toward extremism was perhaps first witnessed by Pressault, 
who recalled stopping Maguire in the hallway of U of O and asking him what he was playing 
 
58 Sarah Boesveld and Sam Cooley, “Path of a Jihadi: How John Maguire went from a high school joke sin 
Kemptville to an Islamic radical,” Ottawa Citizen, December 8, 2014. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Andrew Duffy and Meghan Hurley, “From JMag to Jihad John: the radicalization of John Maguire” Ottawa 
Citizen, February 7, 2015. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Boesveld and Cooley, “Path.” 
64 Ibid. 
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on his iPod. “I’m listening to a lecture by Awlaki,” replied Maguire.67 According to Pressault, 
Maguire was someone who had “a particular zeal. … When you convert, you have a desire to 
learn everything, to know everything. [Maguire] had that.”68 Al-Awlaki’s political influence 
on Maguire became apparent in his social media posts. In October 2012, during his Fall term, 
Maguire tweeted: “How can I sleep with what is happening in Syria?”69 Indeed, Maguire’s 
befriending of Awso Peshdary – an Ottawa man born to a Shia family of Kurdish descent – in 
2012 at an Algonquin College lecture,70 is believed to have helped trigger his radicalization. 
The men bonded over their political interests in the Middle East.71 Peshdary first appeared on 
the Canadian authorities’ radar in 2010 with the discovery of an al Qaeda-inspired terror cell 
with motivations of attacking the Parliament buildings in Ottawa.72  
Eventually, evidence of Peshdary’s influence on Maguire was presented to CSIS and 
the RCMP by Abdullah Milton, a Muslim convert who was working with authorities as an 
informant. Federal Crown prosecutors used Milton’s intelligence to file charges against 
Peshdary. Milton recalled that Peshdary had notified him that he had been speaking with 
Maguire who was already in Syria and was asking for help with a project. Maguire wanted 
ISIS to publish its propaganda in English for western converts who did not speak fluent 
Arabic. Peshdary suggested Milton was the man for the job: “Maguire was trying to convince 
an emir (leader) within ISIS [that] there’s a need … to have an English media wing because 
everything was all in Arabic at that point, and Maguire intended to gather information to 
prove there’s a need,” Milton testified. Allegedly, Peshdary once asked Maguire what other 
types of skills ISIS needed. “Every skill is needed,” Maguire replied. Peshdary told Maguire 
he had advised the “brothers” back home to enroll in training, particularly running or walking 
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obtaining a passport, he “felt it was his obligation to recruit people to go to Syria.” The men 
would often meet at a Tim Horton’s coffee shop, where Milton recalled Peshdary praising 
Khadar Khalib, another Ottawa local who fought in Syria. “It’s easy, it’s not difficult,” 
Peshdary said.73 
In December 2012 Maguire travelled to Turkey. According to his mother, he bribed 
Turkish border guards to let him into Syria.74 In spring 2014 he married a woman named 
Hedeal and invited his mother to the wedding, but the trip was impossible to arrange.75 An 
aid-worker who hosted Maguire in Syria and who was a witness at Peshdary’s trial claimed 
that Maguire was radicalized in Syria.76 He drove him from Turkey’s Hatay Airport into Syria 
by taxi. Maguire portrayed himself as a new Muslim uneducated about the different 
interpretations of Islam and wanted to learn Arabic and help Syrian children.  The aid-worker 
allowed him to stay in his apartment for two months and provided him with a gun for 
protection. During Peshdary’s trial, he recalled laughing at Maguire’s comments about 
helping children. He told him: “This is not the right time for tourism. It’s a war zone.”77  He 
added that Maguire “was new (to Syria) and didn’t know anything.” Allegedly, he met 
Maguire with an imam to whom Maguire asked a “tonne of questions.” One time, he recalled, 
Maguire looked confused and said: “Muslims were at war in Canada?” Maguire later claimed 
that he could not return to Canada since some of his family members had disowned him when 
he converted to Islam.78 
Maguire rose to international prominence when he appeared in an ISIS propaganda 
video giving a speech in front of a destroyed city, a Kalashnikov rifle beside him. Indeed, 
during this period Maguire was especially active on social media. He described Canada as 
“evil,” and his actions as pathways to “the reward of jihad” and “the opportunity for 
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martyrdom.”79 In his ISIS video, Maguire describes the terrorist attacks in Ottawa and Quebec 
in 2014 by Z-B and Couture-Rouleau as a “direct response” to Canadian involvement in the 
anti-ISIS coalition.  He also discussed the reasons behind his views, at length: 
 
I was one of you: I was a typical Canadian. I grew up on the hockey rink and 
spent my teenage years on stage playing guitar. I had no criminal record. I was 
a bright student and maintained a strong GPA in university. So how could one 
of your people end up in my place? And why is it that your own people are the 
ones turning against you at home? The answer is we have accepted the true call 
of the prophets and the messengers of God. To the Muslims who are still 
residing in Canada, I say to you: How can you remain living among the 
disbelievers under their unjust man-made laws which are slowly but surely 
eliminating the rights of the Muslims especially now that the Caliphate is being 
established? How can you stand to live among them peacefully when their 
leaders, who represent the masses, are waging a crusade against your Muslim 
brothers and sisters at this very moment?80 
 
Maguire is believed to have been killed in January 2015 during ISIS’s failed attempt to 
occupy the city of Kobani.81  
 
Michael Zehaf-Bibeau 
Michael Zehaf-Bibeau was born Joseph Paul Michael Bibeau. His mother, Susan 
Bibeau, and his Libyan father, Bulgasem Zehaf, split up before he was born, though the 
couple reunited and married in 1989, only to divorce again in 1999.82 The family lived in 
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Laval, a suburb of Montreal, Quebec, where his mother raised him as a Catholic, sending him 
to a Roman Catholic school. In eighth grade, Z-B started attending Collège Stanislas (a 
Roman Catholic primary and secondary school). The following year he switched to Collège 
Laval, a place where he first tried drugs, and where his former classmates perceived him as a 
kid who loved to have fun and host parties.83  
Starting in 2001 at the age of 19, Z-B was charged with several convictions, including 
assault and battery, gun possession, and drunk driving. In 2004, he served a 60-day sentence 
for possession of a potent hallucinogenic drug. He later explained to a psychiatrist that he was 
raised Catholic but had become a Muslim in 2004.84 Eventually, he cut ties with his mother 
(and father), relocating to British Columbia, Canada, in 2009. In Vancouver, he regularly 
attended a mosque where he formed relationships with other community members. Dave 
William Bathurst, a Muslim convert, met Z-B at the Masjid Al-Salaam and Education Centre 
in Burnaby, B.C., during Ramadan. He recalled that Z-B once told him that he wanted to 
study in Libya because “he was basically sick of trying to fit into Canadian society.”85 
Another time, Z-B told Bathurst that he felt that “the devil [was] after him.”86 Bathurst 
recalled how Z-B’s “erratic” behavior caused problems with other members of the mosque, 
who eventually asked him to stop praying with them. In a bizarre episode, Z-B was arrested at 
the mosque after he contacted the police to notify them of a crime he had committed years 
ago. “He was charged with robbing somebody and he pled guilty to uttering a threat,” lawyer 
Brian Anderson said; “It was something fairly minor and fairly bizarre.” Later, Z-B attempted 
to rob a Vancouver McDonald’s using a wooden stick.87 After the cashier phoned the police, 
Z-B walked outside, threw the stick to the ground, and waited for the authorities to arrive.88 
At the December 2011 hearing, he told the judge that he wanted to stay in prison: “The 
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RCMP couldn’t do the work fast enough. I warned them that if you can’t keep me in, I will do 
something right now to put me in [prison].”89  
He was detained awaiting trial and was given a psychological assessment, which 
concluded that he did not have a mental illness.90 Z-B explained that he was a devote Muslim 
for seven years but had difficulty practicing because of his drug addiction. He wanted to 
overcome this addiction by going to prison. At his trial in February 2012, he underwent a 
second psychiatric assessment, at which point he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder.91 
Eventually released, he became homeless and began using drugs again. He eventually 
returned to Al-Salaam. David Ali, the vice-president of the mosque, noted that “his behavior 
was not normal”; he recalled that Z-B would activate the building’s fire alarm by entering 
through the wrong door.92 He was eventually kicked out of the mosque because he had 
“gotten a hold of keys and stuff from the mosque, and when he got out of jail, he just started 
sleeping there.”93 Mosque administrators met with Z-B after he began complaining about their 
interfaith programs. Rashid recalled Z-B commenting: “Why are you allowing non-Muslims 
into the mosque?”94 Interestingly, Hasibullah Yusufzai – a radical Vancouver-area Muslim 
who was charged in 2014 by the RCMP with visiting Syria to join a terrorist group – was also 
visiting the mosque around this time.95 Bathurst noted that Z-B interacted with Yusufzai, but 
claimed that their engagement occurred before Yusufzai’s radicalization.96 In another series of 
episodes, Z-B, while living at a Vancouver shelter, would regularly begin arguments with 
those around him about contemporary and international affairs, especially with Paul Jarjapka, 
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would argue that Americans were the true terrorists and that ISIS’s murdering of non-
Muslims was justified.97 
Although Z-B was often homeless, the RCMP revealed that before he attacked 
Parliament Hill he had been living and earning a wage in the oil fields of Alberta. They 
assumed that Z-B was saving money to fund “pre-attack activities.”98 The RCMP 
subsequently barred him from acquiring valid travel documents, preventing him from leaving 
the country.99 On September 20, 2014, just four weeks before his attack, he travelled to 
Ottawa, where he visited the Libyan embassy in hopes of renewing his expired passport. 
Embassy officials informed him that it would take several weeks to assess his request.100 In 
the meantime, his application for a Canadian passport was being reviewed by the RCMP, 
delaying the process further. By October 16, 2014, less than a week before he killed Cpl. 
Cirillo, Z-B turned 32 and was again sleeping at a homeless shelter – the Ottawa Mission. The 
Mission was within walking distance to the War Memorial, where his attack began. Mission 
residents remember him as being argumentative, of taking pride in hating Canada, and of 
being on Canada’s no-fly list, though there is no evidence that he was barred from flying.101 
At the Westgate Shopping mall where Z-B bought the car he would later use during his 
assault, he was overheard arguing with another person: “If soldiers bombed your family, 
wouldn’t you want to kill them?”102 On the morning of his attack, Z-B recorded a video on his 
cellphone, justifying his forthcoming assault: “To those who are involved … this is in 
retaliation for Afghanistan and because [Canadian Prime Minister] Harper wants to send his 
troops to Iraq.”103 “The mujahedeen of this world,” he went on, were retaliating. Canada had 
become an enemy because of its “bombing” of innocent Muslims. Cpl. Nathan Cirillo was 
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murdered, standing guard at the National War Memorial; Z-B was later killed across the street 
while storming Parliament.  
Toxicology reports of Z-B’s body showed negative results for drug and alcohol use 
before the attack.104 In a letter sent to the National Post, his mother, Susan, who at the time 
was a senior official with the Immigration and Refugee Board, said he was “an unhappy 
person at odds with the world … [he was] troubled … mentally unbalanced.”105 She 
mentioned that he sought to understand the world by turning to Islam, a process that 
ultimately “did not bring him peace.” She recalled her son’s distance from the family; once he 
moved to Vancouver they had had very little contact with him. She received one short e-mail 
from him in which he stated his intention of meeting the Islamic obligation of respecting 
one’s parents. The last time they met, Susan noted that her son argued how good religion was 
and how she was “wrong to pursue the materiality of this world.” She believed Z-B wanted a 
passport to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Islam and the Quran and to live with others who 
shared his beliefs. In her view, mental illness was at the heart of Z-B’s actions: “At some 
point in his life, my son had a serious addiction to drugs, I don’t know if he overcame it, but 
… it could have left permanent marks and led to his current mental state.”  
 
Damian Clairmont (Mustafa Al-Gharib; Abu Talha Al Kanadi,) 
Damian Clairmont was born in Nova Scotia into an Acadian Catholic family. He 
moved to Calgary, Alberta, as a young boy with his parents who eventually divorced.106 
Although naturally intelligent, he dropped out of high school. An “inquisitive” boy interested 
in science and history, his mother, Christianne Boudreau, described him as someone who 
“cared about the underdog.”107 He sought to protect people and made friends with bullied 
classmates. He did the same at home, protecting his mother from her abusive partner. She 
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remarked: “Damian took a lot of it [abuse] on my behalf and tried to protect me as much as he 
could.”108 When she contacted the police asking to be sent to a shelter with her kids, the 
request was dismissed. The family eventually escaped but the authorities’ lack of action 
“stuck with Damian into his adulthood.” At 17, he attempted suicide. Following his release 
from the hospital, he joined a group home, saw a psychiatrist, and went on medication. He 
was later arrested while purchasing drugs.109 According to Christianne, that same year he 
found Islam: “He was just trying to find where he fit and it was difficult.”110 [Upon 
converting, he changed his name to Mustafa al-Gharib.] Clairmont “struggled with the 
hypocrisy” of the practicing Christians surrounding his family and the Islamic relationship 
with God appealed to him; “it spoke to his heart.”111 She was happy he had become a Muslim: 
“He stopped hiding, stopped blocking himself from the world.” Three years after converting, 
Christianne moved the family across town, whereupon Clairmont began attending a different 
mosque. “He was introduced to people who were stricter,” Christianne recalls, and “this 
opened him up to other ideas … he wanted to be an even better Muslim.” Justin Thibeau, 
Damian’s childhood friend, noted that Clairmont seemed to be constantly changing his 
identity.112 In 2011, Thibeau moved to Calgary and began living with the Clairmonts. He said 
Damian preached to him, disapproved of his lifestyle, and judged him: “You’re going down 
the wrong path … I can open your eyes,” he would say.113 Thibeau’s desire to join the 
Canadian Armed Forces particularly irritated Clairmont who pushed him away from the idea. 
“He couldn’t fathom why I wanted to join the military,” said Thibeau. Clairmont believed the 
military was killing Muslims like him.114 “He would mention things going on in Syria,” 
explained Thibeau, saying “It’s not right what’s going on there.” Although Clairmont never 
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expressed a desire to join the war in Syria, he once told Thibeau: “I wish there was something 
I could do.”115  
Christianne noticed a change in her son in 2011, too. He became more secretive and 
argumentative and would discuss 9/11, and other conspiracies. He began arguing that the 
media was untruthful in their depiction of Muslims; “He would get pretty worked up about it 
and conversations could get pretty heated,” Christianne recalled. Clairmont joined a gym and 
began going on hikes with his group of Muslim friends. According to his mother, he became 
“really zestful” about certain activities, but would soon “get bored and move on to the next 
thing.”116 She believed something like this occurred in his developing desire to learn Arabic 
abroad.117 Clairmont soon became more politically outspoken. Christianne noted that “He 
would say to me, ‘Mom, [Syrian President] Assad is allowing women to be raped. He is 
killing thousands of people and no one is helping.’”118 When Christianne heard her son say 
that he was planning on travelling to Egypt to study Arabic she did not fully believe him.119 
The night before his eventual departure, the family dined at a restaurant, and Clairmont spent 
the rest of the evening playing video games with his little brother. Christianne said that he 
seemed calm and happy.   
The following morning he called her from the plane. The next call came only one 
month later, though Christianne still had no reason to believe he was anywhere else but Cairo. 
In late January, however, CSIS officers appeared at her front door claiming that they were 
tracking her son alongside a group they referred to as “the brotherhood,” as part of a two-year 
investigation. Clairmont was fighting for Jabhat Al-Nusra, though later joined ISIS in 
2013.120 Now referred to as “Abu Talha Al Kanadi (the Canadian) by his comrades, Clairmont 
served for a “long time” as a guard in Aleppo. Ultimately, Clairmont was placed in a 
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controlled by ISIS at the time.121 Desperately wanting to save her son, Christianne planned to 
fly to Turkey to try to bring him back home, but he refused. Clairmont told her he was making 
efforts for the afterlife and promised that she would receive a call if anything happened to 
him.122 His personality was now totally different; she found him colder and firmer. 
Undeterred, Christianne reached out to local imams for help. When Clairmont found out, he 
told her not to listen to the “people with Muslim (or Arab) names” because in his view they 
were “in so many ways far from Islam.”123 He also explained that he felt no guilt for what he 
was doing: “I am finally where I belong.”124  
In August 2013, Clairmont turned to Canada’s National Post to continue justifying his 
actions: “Sure, Canada … is a place where you can allow yourself to believe you have figured 
things out.” Describing his new life, he elaborated: 
 
The benefit for myself in terms of the worldly life is most certainly back in 
Canada where I could see my family, indulge in fornication and infidelity 
legally and limitlessly and stagger around poisoned on intoxicants and then lie 
to myself and the world about ‘freedom’ and how fantastic it is … Challenging 
those learned assumptions … is always much harder to do. My doing so caused 
a search for truth and ended in a conclusion that Islam was the answer. With 
that came Islam’s concept of working for an afterlife that never ends, and not 
trading success in that life for the things assumed — by my prior conditioning 
— to be successes in this life. An eternity in Paradise cannot be traded for 70 
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 In December 2013 Clairmont sent a message saying that he was “still waiting” to be 
martyred.126 He praised Al-Qaeda as Syria’s liberators.  
During this period, a popular jihadist blogger, Abu Dujana, shared details about 
Clairmont. He confirmed being part of the same study group as Clairmont which met at the 8th 
and 8th prayer room in Calgary.127 Dujana argued that ISIS fighters like he and Clairmont 
fought “a global system of oppression” in which “innocent men, women, and children are 
pleading for our help.” Imam Navaid Aziz, who led prayers at the 8th and 8th facility – which 
eventually closed due to its link to several Canadian jihadist fighters – noticed the group in 
the mosque: “I saw them a couple of times, but I never saw anything first-hand that would 
arouse my suspicion. In front of me, nothing ever happened.”128 “I could never infiltrate that 
circle,” the imam recalled, and “eventually, I found out that they’re gone.”129  
On January 14, 2014, ISIS’s Twitter account announced Clairmont’s death, noting that 
he had been captured and killed by the Free Syrian Army in a battle near Aleppo.130 Abu 
Turab confirmed the news, adding that Clairmont’s main motivation was to help the Syrian 
people and that “he was not a threat to Canada…Nor did he want to kill people 
everywhere.”131 In support of this view, Clairmont’s mother reiterated that “in his heart, he 
was there to help women and children. That would be Damian, he always believed in helping 
others.”132 
 
Concluding Thoughts: Conversion to Extremism from Theory to Practice  
 
Presented as the article’s conclusion, what follows is a synthesis of our empirical data 
matched against the theoretical explanations for conversion to violent extremism. We add a 
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contextual layer to the open-source record by integrating original interview data on each of 
the three Canadian cases to further assess the process. Our analysis provides scholars with 
suggestions for the next steps in further improving our understanding of the factors and 
circumstances that drive conversion to violence. 
 
Ideology 
There is some direct evidence that each of our cases shared an ideological affiliation 
with Salafi-jihadism. Salafism itself is a popular ideological orientation teaching meticulous 
adherence to the way of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ or “the pious predecessors” (the first generations 
after the Prophet), while generally rejecting other sources of influence. Salafi-jihadism is a 
step further in this direction, in which followers raise awareness among other Muslims that 
their religion has been declining in political, economic, military, and cultural terms.133 
Perceived humiliation of Muslims as part of an “anti-Islamic alliance” consisting of 
Crusaders, Zionists, and “apostates,” calls for a dedicated program of action (including 
martyrdom) seeking to overturn the current course of history.134 All three individuals likewise 
took efforts to increase their religious practice, in similar but at times different ways. 
During an interview, Adam Hirwa, a friend with whom Maguire informally studied 
the Arabic language at the University of Ottawa, revealed that Maguire used to “hang out with 
people who followed Sufi Islam.”135 Hirwa, who is also a convert to Islam, was surprised 
when Maguire “changed” and began sharing radical ideas online. “The theme of what he 
shared online was about the ‘dos and don’ts’ of sharia within the context of war,” said Hirwa. 
While Maguire never openly stated his ideological association, his views did not reflect the 
Sufi doctrine, but rather that of Salafi-jihadism. This was manifested when he suggested that 
Muslims in Canada should not live with “the disbelievers under their unjust man-made laws” 
and that Western leaders, “represent the masses” that are waging a “crusade” against 
Muslims. Maguire also openly stated that he wanted to be martyred. Further, while they 
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attended Arabic lessons together, Hirwa said he “observed” Maguire increasingly “becoming 
more religious,” in different ways, supporting Pressault’s view (expressed above) that he had 
a particular “zeal.”  
Z-B shared Maguire’s views. They first became apparent when he railed against his 
mosque’s interfaith programs and justified murder as a response to Western foreign policies. 
He was against allowing non-Muslims into the mosque, and like Maguire, sought to deepen 
his religious practice, illustrated by his establishing brief contact with his mother out of 
religious obligation. Moreover, in the video he made on the day of the shootings, Z-B 
suggested that Western leaders were preventing Muslims in the Arab world from 
implementing their religious law – demonstrating in a similar way that Maguire did, the 
Salafi-jihadist aversion to “man-made laws.” These themes resonate in Clairmont’s case, too, 
who openly extolled the Salafi-jihadist’s misinterpreted Islamic idea of martyrdom, what is 
normally (according to this religious tradition) supposed to be a noble death fighting for the 
right cause. Like Maguire and Z-B, he continued to increase in religiosity. In interviews with 
us, his mother, Christianne Boudreau confirmed this by recalling his introduction to “stricter” 
Muslims once the family relocated, compelling him to become “an even better Muslim” 
himself.136  
While all three men embraced certain Salafi-jihadist narratives, none necessarily 
engaged in terrorism because they considered themselves Salafi-jihadists. Rather, they 
associated their personal grievances with certain paradigms that the ideology predicates upon. 
These narratives reinforced the various (and evolving) political, religious, and social views 
that the men held. As Roy suggests more broadly, Clairmont, Maguire, and Z-B seem to have 
cherry-picked certain ideological paradigms and positions, largely based on Salafi-jihadism, 
that appealed to their shifting sensibilities.137 Indeed, Salafi-jihadist narratives combined with 
the longing Clairmont, Maguire, and Z-B expressed for expanding their religious practice, 
played a central role in driving all three men towards violence and terrorism. 
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Social Networks and Charismatic Influencers 
At some point in their radicalization, Maguire, Z-B, and Clairmont interacted with 
other known and suspected extremists, both physically and virtually. However, unlike 
Maguire and Clairmont, Z-B never joined a radical milieu and was not part of a wider 
network of friends who shared his extremist views. None appear to have been associated with 
an international terrorist network before physically joining such movements overseas.  
Perhaps the first recruiter that Maguire met in Ottawa was Peshdary, suspected of 
having recruited several ISIS fighters from Canada. However, the aid-worker who hosted 
Maguire in Syria argued that he was radicalized only after arriving in Syria. This narrative is 
difficult to accept in full if only because Maguire listened to Al-Awlaki's lectures while 
already in Ottawa, and had become a close friend of Peshdary. Moreover, before leaving 
Ottawa, Maguire made Facebook posts demonstrating that he was already emotionally 
invested in the Syrian conflict; he was likely radicalized and kept it secret to avoid problems 
at the border upon his departure. Despite the evidence that Z-B was associated with Yusufzai 
– a known extremist – and that the men spent time together, Yusufzai’s actual influence on Z-
B is not fully known. Since Z-B was vocal about his political and religious views, Yusufzai 
possibly encouraged or accelerated his path towards violence. And yet, unlike Clairmont and 
Maguire, Z-B felt the need to have his views acknowledged and approved by others. He was 
vocal about his beliefs, argumentative with anybody who would listen.  
During an interview with Clairmont’s mother, she confessed that at times her son felt 
isolated and lonely, seeking out a community where he fit. As Navaid Aziz, a Calgary imam 
told us, social networks are especially crucial at “the phase where converts and other Muslims 
are looking for people that identify with similar mindsets.”138 Clairmont’s and Maguire’s 
cases illustrate the importance of group networks in the recruitment of extremists. Imam Zijad 
Delić from the South Nepean Muslim Community in Ottawa, in an interview, suggested 
further that converts who are new to the Muslim community meet “people who are into 
 
138 Navaid Aziz, (Director of Religious and Social Services for the Islamic Information Society of Calgary), 














ISSN: 2363-9849          
religion [and] have more time for religion than regular guys.” 139 Such people “can always 
give these converts more time and space and that’s what converts look for.”140 Considering 
that converts can often feel lost and isolated upon accepting their new religion, imam Delić 
argues that “they look for somebody to be their brother and sister, and if regular guys don’t 
offer time because we are busy with other stuff, then they go to somebody who has time, and 
these people who have time are basically people who can easily misguide them.”141 
Individuals with time to shape the newfound belief structures of converts may also, at times, 
be the very same individuals who are keen to spread radical interpretations. 
Unlike Z-B who appears not to have followed a specific preacher or mentor, Maguire 
and Clairmont watched and listened to Al-Awlaki’s lectures. The path that led them to Al-
Awlaki remains unclear. Ms. Boudreau recalled, during an interview with us, how Damian 
would spend entire nights browsing and watching videos online, which we now know 
included some of Al-Awlaki’s speeches.142 His behaviour puzzled her, she noted, but she 
“never imagined” what was going to eventually happen. Imam Delić also credited the role 
charismatic leaders have on converts, including those in our study.143 In his view, the 
charisma and ability to command respect and obedience that mentors possess, help them 
exploit vulnerable Muslims – including converts still grappling with new ideas, beliefs, and 
behaviours – who “think the same and feel the same pain.”  
 
Political Grievances 
All three individuals in our study used political grievances to justify their engagement 
in violence. They sought to retaliate for perceived oppressive and unjust Western (and 
Canadian) policies. They likewise each understood the world in dichotomous terms, between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, a theme Berger explores in suggesting that extremism is borne out 
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February 22, 2019. 
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141 Ibid. 
142 Boudreau, interview with the authors. 














ISSN: 2363-9849          
of an “us versus them” worldview, escalated by the perception that the success of “us” is 
indivisible from violent acts against “them.”144 
In his speeches, Maguire often pointed fingers at Muslims living in the West under 
Western leaders who were “waging a crusade against [their] Muslim brothers and sisters.” He 
used this logic to justify Z-B’s attack in Ottawa; blowback for Canada’s supposed foreign 
atrocities. Maguire’s friend, Hirwa, explained to us that Maguire “messaged me from Syria, 
and began using radical terms like ‘Kuffar’ to address Western leaders … I was confused 
because he never spoke like that before” in explaining his worldview and evolving belief 
structures.145 Similarly, in his video, Z-B describes his act as retaliation for Canada’s foreign 
policies. Clairmont, too, blamed the government for oppressing Muslims “like him,” though 
he appeared more focused on Assad’s atrocities in Syria. Interestingly, unlike Maguire and 
ZB – who saw attacks in Canada as a way of communicating extremist intent – Clairmont 
demonstrated less abhorrence toward Muslims and non-Muslims living in Canada. While in 
Syria he abstained from calling for domestic attacks, focusing instead – as his many 
engagements with the National Post suggest – on rejecting the Western lifestyle.   
Imam Delić explained that converts “are bombarded with injustices happening in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, and then people basically stop thinking anymore and ask 
themselves: ‘what can I do?’” He suggested that extremist leaders actively capitalize on these 
grievances to attract potential recruits and ultimately, in the later stages of radicalization, 
introduce the religious justification for violence.146 Indeed, acknowledging that a majority of 
Muslims worldwide have similar, if not identical political grievances but never resort to 
violent extremism, partially illuminates the role of political grievances as a factor of 
radicalization. While many terrorists use political reasons to justify their violent extremism, 
this factor alone does not explain why some converts become radicalized or engage in 
political violence. Nonetheless, the overwhelming presence of hatred toward Western foreign 
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policies among extremist converts establishes this element as a core component in their 
radicalization process. 
 
Psychological Factors  
Biographical details reveal that Maguire did not have a record of mental health issues, 
while both Z-B and Clairmont were diagnosed with bipolar mood disorder and depression, 
anxiety, and identity issues, respectively. Z-B, however, had two contradictory psychiatrist 
assessments, in which he was also deemed mentally healthy at one point. And Vancouver 
shelter residents where Z-B lived also believed he was sane, if not always rational. On the 
other hand, in an interview with us, one of  Z-B’s friends, strongly reiterated: “I think Michael 
had mental health issues. I genuinely think that.”147 The RCMP’s declaration that Z-B was 
mentally ill adds further credibility to the claim, evidence that compounds an assessment of 
certain periods of Z-B’s life (e.g. stating that “the devil was after him”; wishing to be 
incarcerated). In contrast, Clairmont suffered from depression and anxiety as a teenager, 
which, according to his mother, was a product of domestic violence.148 His suicide attempt 
further demonstrates the degree of his personal struggles. In interviews, his mother recalled: 
“My son was bipolar,” notwithstanding psychiatric assessments suggesting otherwise. “I can 
tell you … the psychiatrist was an idiot and an egomaniac and had no clue. It went much 
deeper than that.”149 Ms. Boudreau recalled further that her son took medication “for ADHD, 
not for bipolar disorder.” And yet, “something wasn’t adding up. Damian had a lot of 
emotional issues, depression, and everything else that he had gone through.”150 Indeed, Z-B’s 
exploration of drugs and criminality, and Clairmont’s attempted suicide, suggest that as 
opposed to Maguire they were both more inclined to take risks, a trait Kleinmann argues is 
shared with many other converts who radicalize.151  
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Socio-Economic and Criminal Circumstances 
 The empirical data demonstrate a variation of economic, social, educational, and 
criminal circumstances across the three cases. For instance, all three men seem to have grown 
up in similar economic environments. Clairmont’s mother confirmed that he was raised in a 
middle-class family, and while Z-B struggled with poverty and homelessness as an adult, both 
his and Maguire’s families appear to have been financially comfortable. Z-B’s mother was a 
senior government official and his father owned two Montreal nightclubs. Moreover, as 
young adults, all three men were employed at some point. However, as Rabasa and Benard 
illustrate is often the case with radical converts, they were employed in low-skill jobs: 
Maguire worked in a grocery store; Clairmont held a couple of jobs, including at a Dare 
Foods warehouse (where he was praised for his “amazing work ethic”);152 and Z-B worked in 
Alberta’s oil fields, a low-skilled but lucrative position. 
And yet, all three were socially alienated from mainstream Canadian society. Z-B and 
Clairmont were vocal in their abhorrence of Canadian society, in which they struggled to fit in 
because of their Islamic beliefs. Z-B’s history of crime and addiction likewise contributed to 
his struggle to relate to Burnaby’s Muslim community and led to further social alienation 
therein. As a teenager, before his conversion, Clairmont’s identity crisis fed into a larger 
struggle to accommodate his Christian community; as a Muslim, he later developed a disdain 
for contemporary liberal society. And some of Maguire’s university friends likewise 
described him as socially alienated.  
Concerning higher education, only Maguire proved academically inclined, having 
been admitted to prestigious business schools in both the US and Canada. During an 
interview, Hirwa confirmed that “everyone was aware of Maguire’s academic success.”153 
Conversely, Z-B and Clairmont showed much less interest in higher education: whereas Z-B 
graduated from high school, Clairmont dropped out. Interestingly, however, all three converts 
strived to learn more about Islam and demonstrated a strong desire to enroll in Arabic or 
Islamic studies abroad. In an interview, Hirwa recalled how Maguire in the early stages of his 
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conversion and while they were taking Arabic lessons together, was keen on travelling abroad 
to study Arabic. Z-B also told a friend of his he wanted to study in Libya, and always carried 
a “small Qur’an” around that he would “study and use to argue with.”154 Similarly, Clairmont 
told his mother in 2012 that he wanted to go to school to become an imam: “He began 
learning Arabic in preparation … and said he wanted to go to university in Saudi [Arabia] or 
Egypt.”155 Informally, he studied Islamic theology in Calgary. However, after leaving Canada, 
instead of enrolling in an Egyptian university as he had promised his mother, he joined Jabhat 
al-Nusra.  
In sum, while all three converts were raised in middle-class families, showed an 
interest in certain aspects of education, and held a range of low-skill jobs as young adults, 
they each struggled with social alienation, which helped feed perceptions of personal and 
political victimization.  
 
Enabling Environments 
All three men found an enabling environment online: Maguire regularly engaged with 
Al-Awlaki’s lectures; Z-B watched and shared Taliban videos; and Clairmont spent hours 
researching extremist material online, to the point that his mother recalls him “falling asleep 
while watching videos.”156 And to a certain degree, they likewise found a physical enabling 
environment. Z-B is thought to have met publicly and privately with Yusufzai. And both 
Maguire and Clairmont were members of radical clusters in Canada where they regularly and 
physically interacted with other suspected and known militants and extremists: the former met 
with Peshdary, the latter with Salman Ashrafi, Collin and Gregory Gordon, and others.  
 
Final Thoughts 
In sum, the empirical evidence from Canada leads us to several questions about the 
phenomenon of the progression of converts to radicalization and violent extremism. For 
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instance, there are elements of Salafi-Jihadi ideology in the ideas expressed by all three men. 
And yet, what specifically led our cases toward accepting these ideas, especially given the 
differences in their radicalization processes? The role of social networks is also puzzling. The 
three men were socially alienated from the mainstream Canadian society but two of them 
were part of a radical group. Within this context, are radical social networks formed in the 
post-radicalization phase or before? Conversely, mentors appear to be effective in either 
phase; they tend to focus on political grievances and instill feelings of victimization among 
vulnerable Muslims. Indeed, all three men shared similar political grievances. But given that 
political grievances are likely experienced by many other Muslim converts who nonetheless 
speak up against violence, how does this factor relate to other triggers in leading to 
radicalization?  
In terms of mental health, Z-B and Clairmont suffered from certain illnesses; what is 
unresolved, however, is the effect these issues may have had on their progression to violent 
extremism. Are certain mental health issues more important in feeding the radicalization 
process than others? Furthermore, all three men were raised in middle-class families and held 
low-skilled jobs during their life; Z-B was the only one with a criminal history. Are 
uneducated, less professionally successful converts more likely to become radical? And are 
certain crimes more likely to be identified as antecedent conditions of a radical convert? Our 
cases likewise suggest the internet was the primary enabling environment of radicalization. 
An important aspect of this finding in relation to converts is whether they are more likely to 
become radicalized as opposed to born Muslims who generally have more knowledge about 
their faith and are more likely to weed out the radical rhetoric encountered online. How 
should we gauge, then, the value and role in-person religious education has compared to 
online religious education in the radicalization of converts?  
And finally, in terms of responding to convert radicalization, what strategies might 
helpfully defuse the process? From a preventing (or countering) violent extremism (PVE) 
perspective, our findings suggest a role for the convert’s larger community, friends, and 
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series of studies, families are not only considered the main targets for prevention and 
intervention, but an important resource for scholarship.157 Studies also suggest that once 
parents are confronted and begin grappling with the radicalization of their children, they often 
move toward a “less controlling, ignoring reaction” driven by a sense of powerlessness; they 
essentially lacked the tools for coping with emerging developments.158 Still, other research 
demonstrates that while friends are most ideally positioned to intervene, they may likewise be 
reluctant to reach out to PVE services.159 More research is needed, here, on the value of 
building and distributing unbiased public knowledge on conversion and radicalization, on the 
most effective ways to engage parents, families, and the broader community within PVE 
design and implementation, and on building lessons and best practices from a wider slice of 
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